Interesting article. The Hamlet Security rating was certainly not perfect, but I think it is the best data the US could have realistically gotten given the times. If you take it as a general guide, the data does accurately describe which side controlled a village. I believe that something like it should have been adopted in the early 1960s.
One thing that needs to be taken into account on the effectiveness of air strikes and artillery strikes on Vietnamese villages is what happened afterwards.
From subjective commentary at the time, if US/ARVN forces captured the village and pacified it with local forces 24/7, they got the support of the villagers in the long-term. This typically occurred after 1968.
If, however, the Allies shelled a village and then let the VC maintain control of the village afterwards, then the villagers blamed the US/ARVN. This was most common before 1968.
In general, I believe that the Vietnamese villagers wanted peace and stability in their village, and they did not care who gave it to them.
Not sure if you can parse the existing data to prove or falsify this theory with existing data, though.
Madeline - I would be interested in your take on Mark Moyar's Triumph Regained: The Vietnam War, 1965-1968. Mark had access to fully declassified records from the US, Russia (then Soviet Union), the PRC, and Vietnam (formerly North Vietnam).
I have read a couple of his books, but I did not realize that he recently wrote a new one. I will have to check it out.
My take on his other books:
"Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965" is a an excellent overview of the time period. He makes a convincing argument that Diem was a much better leader than most historians believe.
"Phoenix and the Birds of Prey" is also fairly good, but it gets a bit tedious. I think it deserved better editing.
Same with "A Question of Command"
My main complaint with Moyar is that he leans too heavily on the concept of Leadership. He believes good leadership (i.e. officers and NCO) leads to effective fighting forces. Given that he has no way of measuring leadership, it sometimes feels like a circular argument.
Volume 2 is significantly different than volume 1 ("Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965") since Moyar had access to declassified archives for all combatants and key supporters (e.g. Soviet Union, China) to aid in writing volume 2. Access to those archives makes a tremendous difference in how to understand what happened, why, and how...I expect at some point there may be a revised volume 1 after he finishes volume 3.
Unfortunately, I grew up "old school Army" when it comes to leadership. I know it when I see it and can recognize it when it is absent, but it is, I think, very difficult to teach. I was very fortunate to have senior mentors in my career (e.g. GEN(Ret) Vessey and LTG(Retired) Woodmansee) who served in Vietnam and went through the pains of "reinventing" the Army in the postwar period. I was fortunate to have many discussions with them - what they observed at the time in their senior leaders - and how not to make the same mistakes those leaders made...
I can think of nothing more horrifying than going into combat with incompetent leaders. I am willing to die for my mistakes, but not because of some other bozo's mistake.
Interesting article. The Hamlet Security rating was certainly not perfect, but I think it is the best data the US could have realistically gotten given the times. If you take it as a general guide, the data does accurately describe which side controlled a village. I believe that something like it should have been adopted in the early 1960s.
One thing that needs to be taken into account on the effectiveness of air strikes and artillery strikes on Vietnamese villages is what happened afterwards.
From subjective commentary at the time, if US/ARVN forces captured the village and pacified it with local forces 24/7, they got the support of the villagers in the long-term. This typically occurred after 1968.
If, however, the Allies shelled a village and then let the VC maintain control of the village afterwards, then the villagers blamed the US/ARVN. This was most common before 1968.
In general, I believe that the Vietnamese villagers wanted peace and stability in their village, and they did not care who gave it to them.
Not sure if you can parse the existing data to prove or falsify this theory with existing data, though.
Madeline - I would be interested in your take on Mark Moyar's Triumph Regained: The Vietnam War, 1965-1968. Mark had access to fully declassified records from the US, Russia (then Soviet Union), the PRC, and Vietnam (formerly North Vietnam).
Chris, I haven't previously heard of or read Moyar's work, but it looks fascinating! I will need to give it a read for an alternative perspective
I have read a couple of his books, but I did not realize that he recently wrote a new one. I will have to check it out.
My take on his other books:
"Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965" is a an excellent overview of the time period. He makes a convincing argument that Diem was a much better leader than most historians believe.
"Phoenix and the Birds of Prey" is also fairly good, but it gets a bit tedious. I think it deserved better editing.
Same with "A Question of Command"
My main complaint with Moyar is that he leans too heavily on the concept of Leadership. He believes good leadership (i.e. officers and NCO) leads to effective fighting forces. Given that he has no way of measuring leadership, it sometimes feels like a circular argument.
Volume 2 is significantly different than volume 1 ("Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965") since Moyar had access to declassified archives for all combatants and key supporters (e.g. Soviet Union, China) to aid in writing volume 2. Access to those archives makes a tremendous difference in how to understand what happened, why, and how...I expect at some point there may be a revised volume 1 after he finishes volume 3.
Unfortunately, I grew up "old school Army" when it comes to leadership. I know it when I see it and can recognize it when it is absent, but it is, I think, very difficult to teach. I was very fortunate to have senior mentors in my career (e.g. GEN(Ret) Vessey and LTG(Retired) Woodmansee) who served in Vietnam and went through the pains of "reinventing" the Army in the postwar period. I was fortunate to have many discussions with them - what they observed at the time in their senior leaders - and how not to make the same mistakes those leaders made...
I got nothing but respect for you.
I can think of nothing more horrifying than going into combat with incompetent leaders. I am willing to die for my mistakes, but not because of some other bozo's mistake.