Well written and interesting essay! I would add/critique to the revolving door component of it though, while the essay has a nuanced position on the revolving door, its defense of it, in my opinion, may miss broader systemic contexts that perpetuates it. While it points out the value that the revolving door's can add in navigating a rigid acquisition system, it doesnt make an effort to look at some of the broader aspects if the phenomena and explore whether or not the system has always been this way, and if nor what came before and how did it get this way, for example, the The 1986 Defense Reorganization Act made big changes to things, including leadership development and acquisition processes. It led to what was called/sold as the "professionalization of acquisition" and it also led to tings like leadership career tracks partly shifting away from skills development and towards acquisition skills dev that led to the embedding of officers into contractor ecosystems, which may have perverse effects.
Also, the quote that "ingenuity floods every other corner of the country" may unfairly single out the defense sector in a way that has analytical repercussions, like, I think we may have pathologies running across our system writ large, if so, defense may not be able to be improved without those deeper underlying, system scale, issues being fixed
1) A key argument against the revolving door is that it *incentivises* the poor practices of the government by making it essential to hire insiders, thereby ensuring said insiders have a plum job after they leave. I'm not seeing how the article argues against this.
2) Considering that the war in Afghanistan is just about the most comprehensive defeat one can imagine in the circumstances, with the Taliban controlling more territory more securely than they did in 2001, it's hard to attribute any kind of success to the tactics used there. Predators may have been great at pounding sand, but they were completely ineffectual at defeating the Taliban.
Well written and interesting essay! I would add/critique to the revolving door component of it though, while the essay has a nuanced position on the revolving door, its defense of it, in my opinion, may miss broader systemic contexts that perpetuates it. While it points out the value that the revolving door's can add in navigating a rigid acquisition system, it doesnt make an effort to look at some of the broader aspects if the phenomena and explore whether or not the system has always been this way, and if nor what came before and how did it get this way, for example, the The 1986 Defense Reorganization Act made big changes to things, including leadership development and acquisition processes. It led to what was called/sold as the "professionalization of acquisition" and it also led to tings like leadership career tracks partly shifting away from skills development and towards acquisition skills dev that led to the embedding of officers into contractor ecosystems, which may have perverse effects.
Also, the quote that "ingenuity floods every other corner of the country" may unfairly single out the defense sector in a way that has analytical repercussions, like, I think we may have pathologies running across our system writ large, if so, defense may not be able to be improved without those deeper underlying, system scale, issues being fixed
Two critiques:
1) A key argument against the revolving door is that it *incentivises* the poor practices of the government by making it essential to hire insiders, thereby ensuring said insiders have a plum job after they leave. I'm not seeing how the article argues against this.
2) Considering that the war in Afghanistan is just about the most comprehensive defeat one can imagine in the circumstances, with the Taliban controlling more territory more securely than they did in 2001, it's hard to attribute any kind of success to the tactics used there. Predators may have been great at pounding sand, but they were completely ineffectual at defeating the Taliban.